THE LIBRARY
WISCONSIN STATE COLLEGE
RIVER FALLS, WISCONSIN

HUMAN EVENTS

Vol. XIV, No. 22 Saturday, June 1, 1957 Washington, D. C.

News Section

Printed in Two Sections

LABOR: *Reuther hamstrings McClellan* (page 1)
BUDGET: *Ike's second "flop"*
Truth about the "item veto" (page 2)
ATOM: *"Fallout" propaganda* (page 3)
FORMOSA: *Evaluation of riot* (page 2)
Roscoe Pound on Labor (page 4)

Crisis on the Labor Front: The whole stakes in the struggle to reform the labor movement hang in the balance this week — say those who know labor and Capitol Hill.

They warn that, if things continue as they have been going, no constructive measures will emerge from the labor probe. They remain firmly convinced that the whole strategy of investigation and legislation is guided, secretly and indirectly, but no less inexorably, by the will of the "liberal" labor bosses, such as Walter Reuther.

All signs and portents underline this warning about the three-month-old body which originally won such wide acclaim. Such forebodings, it is said, will disappear only as a result of public protest and a quick reversal of policy by Chairman John McClellan.

A "do-nothing" outcome — after the many weeks of malodorous revelations of corruption on a grand scale — was foreshadowed this week as the legislation allegedly designed to reform the evils went before the appropriate committee — and was promptly dubbed by wits as "the mouse brought forth by the labor mountain."

The measure is designed to require audits, registration and public disclosure of the finances of worker pension and welfare funds. Experts, after study of the proposal, express amazement at the seriousness with which commentators take what are actually "piddling" measures to grapple with a tremendous evil. They make the following points:

(1) The law — oddly enough — has not the slightest relation to the colorful proceedings of the hearings. In these, no malpractice was revealed as to the handling of pension and welfare funds. The corruption which was exposed had to do with "union funds" — that is, the money collected as dues and initiation fees from members, and devoted to general union uses.

The point is that *union funds* remain completely under control of the union leaders; *pension and welfare funds* do *not*, being jointly administered, for the most part, by union leaders and employers (hence there is some check on misuse).

Therefore, the labor leaders are virtuously vocal in favor of regulation of *pension and welfare* funds. They say nothing about control of *union funds*, which they would fight to the death.

(2) What good will come from passage of the bill regulating pension and welfare funds? Very little — comes the answer. Perhaps union accounts will be more open to examination by the press than before. But most of the press never seemed to be very anxious to ferret out such info anyway. Experts laugh at the prospect of grimy-handed union members studying union accounts and doing anything about what they find. They say there is no example on record of rank-and-file members successfully ousting officials as a result of disclosure of improper financial statements.

(3) What's all the cheering about? The answer is: because all this is in accordance with the CIO-directed strategy — to divert attention from fundamental evils in the labor movement, concentrating public attention on relatively minor reforms. The "liberal" Newspaper Guild boys in the press produce the "cheers."

The fundamental evils are as follows: the political use of union funds; "goon terror," as practiced by the UAW on the Kohler Company; monopoly; the self-perpetuation of union dictatorships, as in the CIO Steel Workers Union; and compulsory membership in unions, for which the "right-to-work" laws offer a remedy. These are the lines of real reform which Reuther and the leaders of the CIO fear. Hence "diversion of public attention" is obviously slated to continue.

McClellan Committee counsel Robert Kennedy, friend of the CIO, is scheduled to continue to "beat the dead horse of Dave Beck," in coming hearings by concentrating the probe on Nathan Shefferman, Beck's picturesque friend. Kennedy reportedly will make a great play of an exposé of Shefferman, and point out that he is thus investigating "management" as well as "labor." Actually Shefferman is no "employer," but only a "consultant" hired by unfortunate employers to diminish as much as possible the "bite" inflicted on them by labor leaders of the Beck type.

Capitol Hill is reluctant to accept such a sordid end to the once-promising committee. It is lamented that the quite conservative and well-meaning chairman, McClellan, has let himself be led to this point by counsel and Democratic party considerations.

However, his only salvation — it is agreed by observers — would be a reversal of course and collaboration with three Republican members of his committee — Goldwater, Curtis and Mundt — in their plans for a genuine investigation into the evils which afflict the labor movement.

Stassen: Representative Lawrence Smith (R.-Wis.) voiced a widespread opinion on Capitol Hill this week when he told HUMAN EVENTS:

Published weekly at 1835 K Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.
Copyright 1957 by HUMAN EVENTS, INC.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"It is regrettable that Harold Stassen is in charge of negotiations with the Russians at the London conference, in an attempt to reach a disarmament pact. Stassen has earned the distrust of a majority of the GOP members of Congress by his disregard for economy, his one-worldism and carelessness of the national interests of the U.S.A. He represents no important element of American life save a few bureaucrats — holdovers from the Roosevelt-Truman era. Any recommendations he may convey from this London conference will be given unusually critical scrutiny by Congress."

Not Merely Gossip: According to the diplomatic grapevine, Secretary Dulles is already getting ready to "sell" Congress on a disarmament agreement with Soviet Russia. He feels confident that Stassen will bring back some sort of proposed pact.

Hence, he is preparing to "take congressional leaders into his confidence" and tell them that the President is convinced that we should take a chance and enter a disarmament pact with the Communists. The reason why the President is so moved — Dulles will say — is this: he fears that unless we have substantial disarmament, within five years the cost of armament will spiral to such a dangerous extent that the U.S. will "go broke." (See "Week of the Atom," below.)

What Happened on Formosa: "The Free Chinese on Formosa simply want us to treat them on a par with their old enemies, the Japanese" — such is the explanation of the anti-American outbreak on Formosa offered by "old Asian hands" in the Government, who know not only Formosa but Korea and Japan as well. What many Chinese in Taipeh want is that the U.S. extend a "Status of Forces" agreement to them as well as to the Japanese. It is noteworthy that the Formosa disorders started after the U.S. military authorities in Japan decided to hand over William S. Girard, an American soldier, to Japanese authorities for trial.

Not only Free Chinese, but also Koreans and Filipinos — it is claimed — feel that they are treated in a "lower caste," for they have no "Status of Forces" arrangement with the U.S., while the Japanese do. Since the Pacific war was waged to free the Chinese, Filipinos and Koreans from Japanese domination, the sense of unfair treatment felt by these nationalities can well be imagined.

"Flop II": Ike's first TV appeal, on May 14, was bluntly characterized in the press as a "flop." Now the same term is applied to his second, on May 21.

The principal hope entertained by White House strategists was that the vote in the House of Representatives on the Defense budget, which had been sharply cut in committee, would indicate that the old Eisenhower "appeal" remains effective. Yet, after "putting the heat" on House members, the White House was proved wrong.

As a matter of fact, letters or wires written by constituents to members of Congress showed that, despite the "heat" and the second TV oratorical effort, sentiment against the Budget remains much the same. An increase of communications favoring the President's stand created — for a few hours only — an impression that the President had met with some success.

But alert reporting showed that this was due to an "organized" response (the kind which members of Congress habitually discount). North American Newspaper Alliance reporter Thomas Winship on May 24 stated that Ike received an "amazing" response, "largely because it was engineered that way." Winship said that some Senators were "amazed" when they received "back Ike" wires which had been sent even before Ike made his TV address. The "engineering" had proved faulty.

Apart from the serious political implications of this public rebuff to the man who was elected by a big majority last November, friends of the President's Budget worry about two developments that may widen and deepen his defeat:

(1) The signal House victory for economy on Defense presages an end to the White House attempt to obtain power for an "item veto." As it stands, Ike has to veto the entire bill or none of it. White House publicity agents claimed that the "item veto" would further "economy," that Ike could select wasteful items and eliminate them. Congress's attitude was: "Who's talking about economy now?"

> **Actually, Congress will not grant the item veto because it would yield the power of "political life or death" over many members of Congress to the Executive. With this veto power, the White House could threaten unfriendly members of Congress with the veto of their local projects, while accepting the local projects of friendly legislators. Thus, congressional independence would be seriously endangered.**

(2) Budget-cutting enthusiasts in Congress, following the Administration defeat this week, reportedly will try to go much further. Hitherto, it has been assumed that appropriations made in previous years, but not yet spent, are "permanent by law." This has never been the case, but it has been assumed that Congress would not touch these "continuing" appropriations.

Today, it is believed that Senator Byrd will seek to reconsider these unexpended balances in a search for potential cuts. Besides the Defense budget, which has yet to reach the Senate, there is talk of fertile fields of cutting unexpended balances in such areas of the Government as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Rural Electrification Administration, among others. In short, there opens a vista for far heavier cuts in the Budget than had hitherto been expected.

Week of the Atom: Washington simmered this week with a batch of controversies over the chief weapon in America's defense arsenal — the atom.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Vying for headlines were the atomic disarmament conferences in London and the "fallout" hearings (before the Joint Subcommittee on Atomic Energy) in Washington. Deep in the inside pages was the continuing debate over the "Atoms for Peace" treaty.

The disputes in each of these areas raise the ghost of old follies long buried and forgotten:

(1) *Disarmament:* Since the summer of 1955, and especially since the Hungarian massacre, the Geneva "Summit" Conference of two years past has been viewed as an unqualified disaster. Now, issuing from Harold Stassen's "victory" last week over Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Arthur Radford, the premonition of another summit meeting broods over the Capital. Eisenhower's decision, that we must once more try to "trust" the Communists, is seen as renewing the cycle of appeasement and psychological surrender.

It is recalled that the late Senator Joseph R. McCarthy was vindicated in this dispute, as in others, with the Administration. Before the 1955 meeting at Geneva, McCarthy — with almost no support — vehemently urged that any "conference" with the Moscow tyrants should take up the question of the enslaved satellite nations. He was overwhelmingly voted down in the Senate and lashed by the "liberal" press as attempting to "dictate" the formation of American foreign policy. Only Hungary, it is observed, could recall the satellites to the memory of the "liberals" and the Administration — and now even Hungary is forgotten.

(2) *Fallout:* As maneuvers toward a "Big Four" meeting on disarmament proceeded, the "fallout" hearings conducted by extreme left-wing Representative Chet Holifield (D.-Calif.) ground out propaganda support. The hearings, travelling the same route that Adlai Stevenson followed in last fall's Presidential campaign (and played to the hilt by the Communist *Daily Worker*), are seen as having the effect of frightening the American people towards acceptance of the disarmament conferences, as well as a curtailment of our nuclear tests.

The widely publicized testimony of Charles Shafer, a Weather Bureau meteorologist attached to the Civil Defense Administration, is cited as an example of statistical confusion which — however sincerely arrived at — badly misleads the American public. Testifying last Tuesday, Shafer stated that, by the 1960's, the Soviet Union could stage an atomic attack on America that would kill 82 million people. Asked if the Communists would actually have the weapons capability for such an attack, Shafer stated that "we are advised" they would.

Checking Shafer's testimony, HUMAN EVENTS learned the following: The Weather Bureau maintains that Shafer's statement was based on information that had come "through" Civil Defense.

Civil Defense, contacted by a member of the HUMAN EVENTS staff, denies this and states that Shafer's testimony had no basis in fact. The official estimate as to the Soviet Union's weapons capability is a closely guarded secret. But, CD adds, Shafer's figure was a gross "exaggeration," apparently based on a completely hypothetical "desk exercise" (set up to see what an atomic attack would "look like") that CD conducted a few months ago — and which had no connection with the actual weapons capability of the Communists. Thus the frightening headlines emblazoned on front pages across the nation last week were completely in error.

Eyebrows went up in the Capital as these facts were passed around. Shafer's statement, it is said, is in the direct line of "atomic stalemate" propaganda exaggerating the atomic strength of the Soviet Union (see "Have They Really Got It?" by Medford Evans, in article section of this issue).

(3) *Atom Treaty:* Behind the smokescreen of the disarmament and fallout proceedings, legislators continued to consider the hotly debated "Atoms for Peace" treaty. New evidence was introduced into the *Congressional Record*, May 22, by Congressman Ralph W. Gwinn (R.-N.Y.): a statement submitted by former President of the American Bar Association Frank E. Holman; a study compiled by the Committee for Constitutional Government; and a dispatch from Providence attorney Robert B. Dresser.

Holman pointed out that the International Atomic Energy Statute is a "proposal to use the treaty process . . . to appropriate American tax dollars," and therefore to "disregard the constitutional safeguard requiring action by the House of Representatives on all appropriations." The Atom treaty, Holman concluded, "again discloses the need for a constitutional amendment clearly stating that any treaty or executive agreement violating the Constitution shall be of no force or effect."

The Committee for Constitutional Government meticulously examined the terms of the treaty and found it organizationally unsound. Repeating Holman's objection, the Committee added: "It would be a good idea to let Russia carry this ball and see how it flops. Without our . . . half a billion of Uranium 235 it will languish a-borning." Dresser drove home the constitutional question: "From what source does the President derive this power to give away the people's money?"

Finally, the spirit of Joe McCarthy continued to stalk his opposition. Tuesday, May 28, Senator Styles Bridges (R.-N.H.) inserted in the *Record* McCarthy's last major speech — attacking the "Atoms for Peace" treaty.

Double Standard: Senator James Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, this week called on the AFL-CIO to avoid creating a double standard with reference to invocation of the Fifth Amendment by union members.

If Dave Beck is to be censured for invoking the Fifth Amendment on questions about his finances, he said, unioneers should be censured equally for invoking it on questions of Communist affiliation.

Not surprisingly, Eastland's indignation was aroused by a group of members of the United Automobile Workers, headed by the far-left Walter

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reuther. He was among the most vocal of AFL-CIO leaders in demanding that its Code of Ethical Practices provide for the ouster of union officials who fall back on the Fifth.

It now develops that, in Reuther's view, the Code applies only on questions involving financies; not on Red ties.

The Senate Subcommittee in the past two weeks has questioned a group of members of UAW local 600 at Ford's River Rouge plant near Detroit; most have refused to talk. The first to refuse was Walter Dorosh, secretary of the local's Tool and Die unit. A few days later, the local's magazine published this statement by local president Carl Stellato:

"Brother Dorosh . . . gave testimony in executive session and [in] the open hearings on Trade Union matters . . . When the question arose whether he is a Communist now, or was in the past, after having consulted with the International Union and being told that Union policy frowns on use of constitutional privileges when testifying on Union finances, *but not when dealing with Civil Liberties*, and upon advice of his attorney, Brother Dorosh invoked his constitutional privilege" (italics added).

School Aid: As the majority and minority of the House Committee on Education and Labor filed their reports this week, feeling in the Capital grew that the $1.5 billion Federal Aid to Schools bill would be defeated. Two factors are seen as especially strong in foreshadowing the failure of the Federal Aid lobby:

(1) It is expected that the "Powell Amendment," directly instrumental in defeating similar legislation last year, will again be appended to the bill. The amendment provides that segregated schools will be deprived of Federal Aid money — thus offending Southern legislators and graphically demonstrating the connection between "Federal Aid" and "Federal control."

(2) The undertow of the economy drive seems likely to pull the Federal Aid bill down, even if a second "Powell Amendment" is not forthcoming. Legislators ask: when spending is already at an all-time high, why embark on a brand-new program?

Finally, it is believed that, apart from the segregation and economy issues, the school bill could easily be defeated on its own "merits." Reason: this year forces opposed to Federal Aid have done a thorough job in exploring the realities of the alleged "crisis" in educational needs, and have broadcast their findings to the public. Especially telling have been the figures relating to vast programs of school construction undertaken by the several states (see HUMAN EVENTS for March 2 and March 16, 1957).

● A footnote to the "Federal Aid" controversy is the school construction program undertaken by the state of Indiana — unique in its readiness to take advantage of the productive capacities of private enterprise. Under the Indiana plan, district school boards are authorized to lease their building sites and construct their schools through private groups. The Indiana legislature has also provided that schools can be constructed away from their permanent site — allowing economical use of prefabricated parts. The "prefabs" are new units designed by Republic Steel and U.S. Steel, which can be rapidly and cheaply assembled, but which yield a high quality structure. Whereas the U.S. Office of Education has estimated average schoolroom costs to be as high as $38,000 per room, the Indiana plan averages about $20,000 per room.

Income Tax: Now available from the Manion Forum of Opinion is a 30-minute motion picture entitled, "It's Here — Forced Work Without Pay." The film, featuring speeches by Dean Clarence Manion, former Commissioner of Internal Revenue T. Coleman Andrews, and Governor J. Bracken Lee, sets forth dramatically and clearly the need for cutting Government expenses, lightening the tax load, and restoring to the people the product of their labor. For information about having this film shown over your local television station, write to: The Manion Forum, St. Joseph Bank Building, South Bend, Indiana.

Between Covers: *Legal Immunities of Labor Unions, by* Roscoe Pound; American Enterprise Association, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.; $1. Reviewed by Frank Chodorov.

L'affaire Beck suggests that the McClellan Committee is bent on unearthing much more skullduggery in the world of labor unionism, and that in the end a spate of preventive laws may be enacted. But, will such laws be effective, and are they really necessary? Perhaps the better way would be to repeal laws which, for purely political reasons, were passed for the explicit purpose of exempting unions from the restraints that common law puts upon other persons and organizations and which opened the way for what can only be described as gangsterism.

That is the conclusion one must draw from the new booklet, *Legal Immunities of Labor Unions*, by Roscoe Pound, the renowned former Dean of Harvard Law School. Beginning with a short history of legal immunities, such as the immunity of the king, of religious bodies, of landlords, of feudal lords, and of rank, the booklet proceeds to show how, in our time, the idea has been applied to labor unions.

"Immunity" is embodied in the Norris-LaGuardia Act and in the Wagner Labor Relations Act. The one exempted the unions from practices which are specifically prohibited under other laws as "restraints of trade," thus giving the unions a monopoly position; the other virtually freed the unions from contractual responsibility, from the necessity of respecting the laws of property and the rights of individuals.

A particularly pernicious feature of the Labor Relations Act was the setting up of the quasi-judicial National Labor Relations Board, having as its function the upholding of the immunities of labor unions and their leaders, even at the expense of the public.

While the booklet, very readable in spite of its studied legal exactitude, does not specifically recommend it, the repeal of these two special privilege laws is about all that Congress need do to clean up the mess that the McClellan Committee has brought to light. New laws are not only unnecessary but may only contribute to an enlargement of labor union malpractices — like trying to cure a disease by palliatives rather than by removing the basic cause of it. It is to be hoped that every Congressman will acquaint himself with the argument of the Roscoe Pound booklet in preparation for the legislative proposals which will surely follow the report of the Select Committee.

Letter from MILTON R. YOUNG, U. S. Senator from North Dakota: "I have been reading HUMAN EVENTS for a long time. I never fail to find important and challenging discussion of the many vital issues of the day. HUMAN EVENTS has the courage to probe into sensitive areas which are not usually the concern of other publications."

TRIAL SUBSCRIPTION to HUMAN EVENTS for new subscribers only: 5 weeks $1.
Yearly rate, $10; 6 months, $6; 3 months, $3.
By first class mail, $12 a year, by airmail (including APO and FPO) $14 a year. FOREIGN: by regular mail, $13 a year; airmail, $18.
Allow us 2 weeks to process new subscriptions and changes of address.
Bound Annual Volume with complete Index $15. Only 1955 and 1956 Volumes are available.
The Declaration of Independence opens: "When in the course of HUMAN EVENTS . . ."

FRANK C. HANIGHEN, *Editor and Publisher*
JAMES L. WICK, *Executive Publisher*
Contributing Editors: FRANK CHODOROV, M. STANTON EVANS

HUMAN EVENTS, 1835 K Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C., is a weekly newsletter reporting from Washington on politics, business, labor and taxes. It was founded in 1944 by Frank C. Hanighen. Published usually in two sections: a 4-page news section and a 4-page article section Entered as second class matter at Washington, D. C. Copyright 1957.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Vol. XIV, No. 22 HUMAN EVENTS June 1, 1957

Article Section *Printed in Two Sections*

Currently before the Senate is the "Atoms for Peace" treaty, which would make the United States a contributor to a "pool" of nuclear materials. The Soviet Union, it is claimed, will also "contribute" — so we have nothing to lose. Harold Stassen has returned to London to continue discussing terms for atomic disarmament by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Administration is entertaining a Communist "open skies" proposal, which would allow Russian planes to "inspect" the Western United States — where our key atomic plants are located.

These programs, wholly or partially indorsed by the United States Government, begin from a single key assumption: *that the Soviet Union has an atomic project roughly equal to our own.* Because of this alleged "atomic stalemate," American policy towards world communism, as in Korea and Hungary, has become marked by defeatism and appeasement. In this article, former Atomic Energy official Medford Evans shows that the "atomic stalemate" has yet to be proved.

HAVE THEY REALLY GOT IT?
Fact and Myth About Soviet Atomic Strength

By MEDFORD EVANS

Of course it is hard to tell what is on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Sometimes you can tell what used to be there. For example, though in 1952 we did not know that Khrushchev was opposed to Stalin (most of us at that time had never heard of Khrushchev), or that Stalin was near death, now we know. We still do not know what is going on today, but our guesses may be better if we think about what went on yesterday.

THE KOREAN WAR was the big event of 1950-51. A lot of American boys were killed and wounded, American prestige was badly hurt, and Red China was made; formal recognition by Great Britain did less for Red China than did our letting the Communists fight us to a draw on the 38th parallel. That is what put Red China in the big time.

Our excuse was that, though we might have defeated Red China as we did North Korea, we dared not provoke Red Russia into atomic war. We left the Communists their privileged sanctuary beyond the Yalu, and we denied General MacArthur access to our abundant supply of atomic weapons, *on the ground that Soviet Russia also had an abundant supply of atomic weapons.*

The propaganda of the time was like this:

> **No possible enemy is so vulnerable [as the U.S.A.]. A comparison with the U.S.S.R. is justified because it is the only country which *has a comparable military capacity* and has shown an alarming unwillingness to cooperate with the United Nations to enforce peace and prevent *nuclear warfare.* The U.S.S.R. is the only nation that could become hostile and *could also produce nuclear bombs.* . . . America has never thought in terms of being attacked or dreamed of *being destroyed.* It is possible *now,* and *by our own invention, the nuclear bomb.* (Gerald Wendt, *Atomic Energy and the Hydrogen Bomb,* Medill McBride Co., 1950, pp. 131, 140; italics added.)**

There were scores of articles, columns, editorials, and commentaries with similar plain intent to warn the United States that we must not go all-out against Red China for fear of atomic retaliation by the Soviet Union.

Now we know that all those warnings helped Red China and the Soviet Union, not us. *The Soviet Union had no atomic stockpile worth speaking of in 1950-51,* except to whatever extent Communist infiltration gave them a silent partnership in our stockpile. This statement, so counter to what was proclaimed at the time, will now not even be contested.

The most fully documented study of Russian atomic capability which I have seen is entitled, *The Soviet Union and the Atom: The Early Years,* by M. J. Ruggles and A. Kramish.* I am not familiar with Ruggles, but Kramish is a nuclear physicist and an expert on foreign atomic intelligence, having been an employee or consultant of the AEC and affiliates for many years.

Here is what Ruggles and Kramish say: "This [industrial and engineering deficiency] explains, in large measure, why the Russians did not achieve an atomic explosion until late 1949 and a significant nuclear weapons capability *until several years after that.*" (Pp. 89-90; italics added.) "Several" is not precise, but in normal use means not less than three. Thus, if Ruggles and Kramish are right (and I know of no one who disputes them on this point), *the Soviet Union had no significant nuclear weapons capability with which to oppose General MacArthur at any time when he was in command in the Far East.*** (Legal use construes "several" to mean "more than one," but even two years

* "Research Memorandum No. 1711," April 2, 1956; prepared for the U.S. Air Force Project Rand. Published at Santa Monica, Calif., by the Rand Corporation.

**MacArthur was removed from his commands April 11, 1951.

Published weekly at 1835 K Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.
Copyright 1957 by HUMAN EVENTS, INC.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from "late 1949" is several months beyond MacArthur's recall from Korea.) If MacArthur had been given a free hand he not only might have won a victory over Red China, but might well have prevented Soviet Russia — if she had entered the Korean War — from ever achieving nuclear weapons capability.

Instead of that, we defaulted in face of a bluff.

TWO GROUPS OF AMERICANS who normally debate issues of national policy have on this subject a kind of tacit agreement. Those who seek coexistence and those who go to the brink of preventive war both ask us to assume that Soviet Russia is a nuclear giant. The soft school does this to appease the Communist thirst for international prestige; the tough school does it to guarantee maximum public support (appropriations) for the U.S. armed services.

The result is that the U.S. today is letting itself be bluffed by a hand thrust like a nuclear gun into the Russian blouse pocket. Consider the following:

> **The time is rapidly approaching when, for all practical purposes, the Soviet Union will have attained equality with the United States both in the size of its stockpile of nuclear weapons and in the capacity to deliver them at very long ranges. What should constitute the military policies of the United States in these circumstances is a matter which, even now, calls for the most careful consideration and debate.**

So reads the Foreword to *Military Policy and National Security,* from Princeton University's Center of International Studies. (Edited by W. W. Kaufmann, Princeton University Press, 1956.)

The authors make almost no attempt to support the contention that nuclear equality, or anything like it, actually exists. They hasten, rather, to *assume* an atomic stalemate, then dwell in meticulous and ingenious analysis on what to do about it. This is about like planning to operate for a brain tumor as soon as the patient complains of a headache.

It was Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer who originally (in 1949) persuaded the White House and Capitol Hill that Soviet Russia had an atomic bomb. It was also Dr. Oppenheimer who said (in 1953) of the then much larger volume of scientific evidence concerning Soviet atomic activities: *"We do need one word of warning: This is evidence which could well be evidence of what the government of the USSR wants us to think, rather than evidence of what is true."*

James Burnham forecast ten years ago that the Soviets would shortly claim to have an atomic bomb, whether they actually had one or not. About the same time, according to ex-Red Army Captain Mikhail Koriakov, Moscow launched a campaign against "belly-crawling before foreigners" in order "to put an end to all feeling of fear of Western opponents." * Moscow could not endure the prospect of an Anglo-American monopoly of the revolutionary new weapon, with all the physical and psychological advantages of such a monopoly.

Stalin once said that the atomic bomb does not bother those whose nerves are good. From this it is an easy move to the thought that weak nerves will fear an atomic specter as much as an atomic reality. Specters are, of course, a Communist specialty. Burnham's accurate prediction, that the Communists would soon cause it to be said that they had the atomic bomb, was simply based on an understanding of the Communist mind.

Even the Communists probably did not see at once *all* the advantages of a well-run bluff in this area; for the U.S. has steadily increased its atomic stockpile, and almost in proportion has lost the will to use it. We seem, by a kind of psychological projection, to attribute every technical or productive advance of our own to the enemy as well.

The legend of Soviet atomic capability tends to: (1) make nuclear war seem prohibitively dangerous to many Americans; (2) encourage reliance on "conventional" (*i.e.,* obsolescent and inadequate) methods in military operations (such as Korea) of limited scale; (3) lead us to put so much into nuclear weapons for "deterrence" that we would have a hard time mobilizing for "conventional," non-nuclear war on a large scale. So we are liable to fall between the two stools.

I do not want to be misunderstood. A preventive atomic war is no more to be desired than that a sheriff should automatically open fire on an unarmed bandit. But the sheriff ought not to let himself be bluffed. Neither should we.

Nor should we downgrade the Atomic Energy Commission, the Strategic Air Command, or even the Distant Early Warning Line. Indeed, we need more confidence in them, Personally, I suspect that each of them is a nonpareil in its field. It would be tragic if we threw in a hand like this to a bunch of fourflushers.

HOW DO I KNOW that the Soviets are a bunch of fourflushers? I don't know it for sure. I'm just trying to be reasonable about the matter, which I realize is not considered good form — you are supposed to read Walter Lippmann instead. Here are my reasons:

1) The main reason why it is unreasonable, even now, to credit the Soviets with a formidable atomic stockpile of their own is that *if they had one there would be no doubt about it.* Nor, of course, would they be so anxious to ban nuclear warfare. There is no doubt that they have some jet aircraft, there is no doubt that they have tanks, and there is little doubt that they have some kind of rockets with some kind of electronic controls on them. *They knock themselves out to show these things off, and they are not trying to ban any of them.*

2) There is all the doubt in the world that they have a successful nuclear industry. All anybody has ever seen is stuff for research — high-energy particle accelerators, and near Moscow a two-by-four reactor. Above all, they have good relations with the American press.

To clarify what I mean by "a successful nuclear industry": the last AEC Semiannual Report to Congress shows that the cost of our atomic operations for fiscal year 1956 was $1.6 billion. Almost half, or $729 million, went for "production of special nuclear materials." These materials come from the great plants

* See B. H. Liddell Hart, *The Red Army,* Harcourt, Brace, 1956, p. 418.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at Oak Ridge; Richland, Washington; Paducah; Portsmouth, Ohio; and Aiken, South Carolina. It is not even alleged, in specific terms, that the Soviet Union has anything to compare with these plants. Representing an investment of $4 billion, they are the heart of the atomic energy project.

Raw materials for these plants, and the "cartridges" (made in different plants) for their nuclear "powder," accounted for an additional $562 million of the $1.6 billion. *That Soviet Russia has either the access to raw materials or the facilities for developing and manufacturing weapons that we have will scarcely be contended by any reputable authority.*

3) Only in research can it be seriously argued that the Russians may compare with us. Here, of course, costs are not a reliable measure of achievement (if they ever are). A lead pencil and some scratch paper will occasionally pay off better than a very expensive piece of equipment. Besides, our research equipment is largely nonsecret. (And a whole shipload of it was sent to Russia from this country in 1947 aboard the *S.S. Mikhail Kutuzov.*)

After the Russians had announced, a couple of years ago now, that they were building a huge new cyclotron, C. J. V. Murphy and A. Kramish commented in *Life* (August 8, 1955): "Our scientists conclude that the Soviets obviously must have a good deal of reserve strength to be able to carry out such a project, which has no immediate usefulness to their military and industrial atomic programs." This is a very odd conclusion. All that is clear is that here is a project which the Soviets are in a position to brag about, *and it is one which has no immediate usefulness to their military and industrial atomic programs.* Of course this is not too surprising in a country which typically has produced chess players and fiction-writers rather than practical inventors and/or production engineers, such as Eli Whitney, Frederick W. Taylor, Henry Ford, "Boss" Kettering, and other typically American geniuses.

4) World-power nuclear capability today requires a dependable system of mass production. The burden of proof is on those who affirm that the Soviet Union has such a system.

The burden is not well borne. Like the Princeton group cited above, most experts nowadays speculate on how the U.S. should adjust to "nuclear parity" (usually they say by not using our nuclear weapons), but they beg the question whether nuclear parity actually exists.

Worse than begging the question is the practice of reciting the industrial deficiencies of the Soviet Union, with documentation — and then saying, "*But of course we must remember that they have produced the atomic bomb,*" with no documentation.

Business Week (Jan. 29, 1955), gave a classic illustration. They had a man, they said, who "went behind the Iron Curtain . . . talked to industrialists, closely examined Communist products of all kinds from toasters to oilfield drilling rigs" — obviously not including in this gamut atomic bombs or guided missiles.

"Because of the emphasis on quotas," reported this expert, "Russian plants have had to use unskilled labor in vast quantities. . . . This has lowered productivity, efficiency, and product quality. An engineer may design a fine machine [according to other parts of the article he is more likely not to do so], but when it finally comes off the assembly line, it is roughly and carelessly built."

Then he adds (the italics are mine): *"The only exceptions to this output-above-all thinking are atomic energy and guided missile plants, where tolerances are close and quality a must."* Now that may be. But why does he think so? Why does he believe that the industries he was not permitted to examine are the only exceptions in Russia to the rule governing all the industries which he did examine? How, indeed, does he know there is any atomic "output" at all?

PRACTICALLY ALL the American articles proclaiming "nuclear parity" are based on such doubtful surmise. Let us, for instance, examine the way in which the sister publications, *Life* and *Fortune,* have helped nudge the United States into frightened acceptance of the mythical "atomic stalemate."

"The U.S.S.R. has a Topflight Scientific Team," headlined *Life,* October 3, 1949. "It is even remotely possible," the text went on, "that the Russians have developed a superior bomb." There was a photographic gallery of "Key Figures in Russia's Research Program," identified as Police Chief Beria, two captured Germans (Ardenne and Herz), and Russian scientists Kapitza, Joffe, Semyonov, and Skobeltsin. A *Life* editorial in the same issue urged the U.S. to drop security since we could no longer keep anything of vital importance from the Russians.

It seems, however, that the Russians were doing a pretty good job of keeping secrets from *Life.* Kapitza, it turns out, refused to work on weapons, and was put under house arrest by Stalin; and there is no evidence, it seems, that captured German scientists played a significant role in the Soviet effort. So, in February, 1957, says *Fortune,* adding: "The leading Soviet atomic weaponeer is Igor Kurchatov."

Could be, but *Life* apparently didn't know anything about him in 1949.

What is disturbing is that while *Fortune* in 1957 shows that *Life* in 1949 did not know what it was talking about, neither magazine at any time indicates that such contradictions either affect its standing as an authority or require a candid reexamination of the record. *Though the original stories of Soviet atomic capability are shown to have been full of errors, both the source of the stories and their main point are supposed to be as good as ever.*

Speaking of today's scientific resources in Russia, *Fortune* says: "Another mathematical necessity for modern physics is big computing machinery. Here the Soviets got off to a late start chiefly because *until eight or ten years ago* they had no electronics industry to speak of." Eight or ten years prior to February, 1957 means the period 1947-1949. In 1949, *Life* was saying: "It is even remotely possible that the Russians have developed a superior bomb." With *no electronics industry to speak of?*

All, of course, under the leadership of the paranoid Stalin, the traitor Beria, and Kapitza, who was in jail.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For a brief interval there seems to be harmony in the house of Luce. *Life* having said that Russian scientists "were on their way toward developing a bomb long before Hiroshima," *Fortune* says, "Soviet physicists through mid-1941 were as far along in understanding uranium fission as any group of scientists in the world."

What *Life* says and *Fortune* implies is all wrong, though literally *Fortune's* statement is true. Scientific papers on nuclear fission were published freely until 1940. Till "mid-1941" there was no large-scale atomic program anywhere in the world. *It was precisely from "mid-1941" on that the key practical developments occurred, in America.* Thus the fact that in mid-1941, Russian physicists knew pretty much what other physicists knew — including, among others, German, French, Scandinavian, Japanese, Dutch, Italian, and Hindu, none of whom developed a bomb — did not at all mean that they "were on their way toward developing a bomb."

The Russians were, of course, on their way to Stalingrad, not Hiroshima. Almost precisely in mid-1941, on June 22, Hitler invaded Russia. Till then, according to Ruggles and Kramish, "it would appear that the Soviet Union and the United States were progressing toward important achievements in nuclear physics at about an even pace. . . . *But June, 1941, brought the end of this parallel development. The exigencies of war led to diametrically opposed decisions: for the United States and Britain a sharply accelerated program; for the Russians an almost total halt.*" (Italics added).*

I have never seen a good *argument* that there is a successful nuclear industry in Russia. I understand that there are numerous official releases and dogmatic assertions by experts which imply that there is such an industry. I suppose that authoritarian personalities will take the official releases and the dogmatic assertions at face value. As for me, I will continue (1) to discount them, and especially (2) to observe that the ordinary journalistic interpretations of them are so much hogwash.

IT APPARENTLY NEVER occurs to such deep minds as Messrs. Lippmann and Alsop, or the editors of *Life* and *Fortune,* that the few explosions the Soviets have staged could have been made from stuff they swiped from us. Why would they do that? To achieve the very thing that they have achieved — the paralysis of American will. To suggest that they have had such access to our own project, of course, is to call up the "conspiracy theory of history." But it's a pretty good theory, at that.

For instance: on the basis of papers which Soviet scientists submitted for the 1955 Atoms for Peace Conference at Geneva, Murphy and Kramish reported in *Life,* "the rather surprising discovery that *Soviet nuclear science has adopted practically without variation the unique terminology which flowed from the American atomic project.*" How surprising that your spoons should have the same initials as mine! Especially since our names don't start with the same letters.

"Perhaps the most unexpected borrowing," continues *Life,* "is that of American 'barn' as a measurement of the areas of atomic nuclei. This area became important in calculations of the Manhattan Project more than a decade ago. Although infinitesimally small, the experimentally observed nuclear areas seemed surprisingly large to physicists, and a working group facetiously coined the term 'barn.' The designation stuck, and in mathematical calculations, nuclear areas are expressed as so many barns. Now the Soviets have simply transliterated our word into their alphabet, probably without even knowing its original meaning."

A couple of years ago there was an international conference on radiation in Tokyo, in which ten nations, including Soviet Russia, participated. The Soviet delegate was Professor Anna V. Kozlova, of the Moscow Radiology Institute. She said at an interview: "Russian atomic tests have been conducted within laboratories so no one will get hurt. . . . *Russian atomic tests are not necessarily nuclear explosions.*" (N. Y. *Times,* June 1, 1955, p. 5. Italics added).

"She remained silent," continues the AP dispatch, "when questioned about the Moscow announcements, beginning in 1953, of the progress on nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union."

Was this just a preposterous attempt to show that Soviet atomic bombs have the unique quality of being harmless, or did she let the cat out of the bag — that in a showdown with America, the total of atomic bombs made in Russia would be virtually harmless?

Of the Kremlin Communists expert George Kennan said not long ago: "They bluff a lot."

They sure do.

---

* When Dr. Oppenheimer was asked during his hearing, "Did you in 1943 feel friendly to the idea of . . . informing the Russians who were working on the problem of the atomic bomb?" he replied, "I don't think there were any Russians working on the problem of the atomic bomb."

Medford Evans, author of *Secret War for the A-Bomb* (Regnery), is Professor of Social Sciences at Northwestern State College, Natchitoches, Louisiana. Dr. Evans served eight years as an official in the Atomic Energy Commission, ending as Chief of Training. His most recent contribution to HUMAN EVENTS was "Why I Am an Anti-Intellectual," January 26, 1957.

HUMAN EVENTS was founded in 1944 by Frank C. Hanighen. It is published weekly at 1835 K Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. and reports from Washington on politics, business, labor and taxes. It is usually published in two parts: a 4-page news section and a 4-page article. $10 per year.

TRIAL SUBSCRIPTIONS, new subscribers only: 5 weeks for $1.

ORDER BLANK

HUMAN EVENTS, 1835 K Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

Send me.....reprints of "HAVE THEY REALLY GOT IT?"

at $..... ☐ Payment enclosed ☐ Bill me

Additional copies of this 4-page article: single copy 20¢ (coins, not stamps); 10 copies $2; 100 copies $5; 500 copies $20; 1,000 copies $30. In 5,000 lots $25 per thousand. News section sold separately — at same rates. Unless otherwise ordered, reprints are sent by fourth-class mail which takes ten days to two weeks for delivery. For first-class mail delivery, add one cent a copy, for airmail, add two cents a copy.

Enter my subscription ☐ 5 weeks for $1 ☐ 1 year for $10

Name.....

Street.....

City.....Zone.....State.....

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED